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DATE DISTR. 11 August 1961

SUBJECT Russian Emigres' Views Concern
Possibilities of War.

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1. Among Russians in the US, the present world situation is viewed as follows: Moscow's postwar policy aims to sharpen the cold conflict with the West with the primary objective of dominating Germany and Europe. During recent years Soviet arrogance, resulting from an overestimation of their own strength and underestimation of US potential, has arrived at its peak. One must ask oneself whether among other variants the tactics of the Kremlin are not a conscious and purposeful provocation of the US. This provocation may be based on the feeling that their war preparations have for the moment outdistanced all others, the necessity and the impossibility of avoiding war may also influence Russian policy.
2. The Kremlin is trying to throw moral responsibility for an eventual war on the West. The Soviet note of 14 July is an indictment of the West and is aimed at the Soviet people and the Eastern Bloc. Moral responsibility is an important Soviet propaganda instrument. The contention that the USSR is not ready to wage war at present is unconvincing: nobody knows exactly how great the industrial armament preparations are in the USSR, but it is known that the Soviet effort is getting ready for war has not decreased but on the contrary has increased a great deal since the outbreak of the war. Several authoritative military personalities in the US admit that in case of war the USSR can occupy Europe within two or three months. Even if it were admitted that the Soviet materially are not ready for war, it should be remembered that history proves that action begins not when the aggressor thinks he is ready, but when the necessity created by the political situation forces him into it. It appears that this necessity is becoming real and clear to Stalin and the Politburo. If there is no war, Moscow must abandon all thought of dominating Germany and Europe and resign itself to see Communist influence wane in the world; it will be forced to give up its fifth columns and turn from attack to defense. This would greatly endanger the present regime.
3. At this time, chances for Communist advances are great only in China. In western Europe, the Communists are in a difficult situation. In Italy Communism is less strong today than it was in 1946; and even the Togliatti incident did not produce important disturbances. In France the situation is similar except that when de Gaulle took over, possibilities of Communist action would be reduced to a minimum.

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4. The Marshall Plan aims to reinforce economically the anti-Communist western world and strengthen the military potential of the democratic states. The USSR cannot limit itself to "taming" the satellite nations and backing Communist regimes, permitting at the same time the strengthening of its opponents and the elimination of its fifth columns in their society. The situation has become even more complicated by Tito's position and this must result in a more decided Soviet policy. Moscow never forgive and must punish the culprit: the punishment - Tito's head and that of his comrades. Stooges in other countries are awaiting a solution and if Tito is not punished his bad example may influence the others. The West cannot and does not want to help Yugoslavia; it is difficult to make agreements with a Communist country. Any crisis in the Soviet sphere of influence must provoke a reaction of the Kremlin, because the Soviet must constantly show its power in order to keep Communists, agents, and fellow travelers disciplined all over the world. These are too important an element in Soviet aggressive planning to be allowed to stray.

5. Moscow apparently has three alternatives:

- (a) if Stalin is convinced that the Soviet is ready for a great war he can take advantage of the surprise and immediately attack Europe leaving the cleaning of his own backyard (Tito) to a later day.
- (b) a temporary appeasement of relations with the West for the price of unimportant compromises, occupation and integration of all the satellites into the USSR, elimination of opposition, and complete "Gleichschaltung" of these countries into the Soviet regime. This would postpone the war.
- (c) shelving Tito's rebellion, yielding to the possibility of other rebellions among the satellite countries, and acceding to a loss of influence by the Communists in Europe and in the world, seeing the eastern bloc disintegrate. This concept is completely unrealistic because it contradicts the essence of the Soviet regime, brings complete defeat in the political field because such yielding would have to destroy the regime in the USSR proper.

If, therefore, the third conjecture must be put away, compromise in the Berlin problem would not be possible and surprises may be expected. Speculation about feuds within the Politburo are disappointing. Strengthening of pro-war elements in Soviet policy should, rather, be expected.

6. Actually there are no "problems" between the Soviet and the West. There is only masked or open Soviet aggression aiming at domination of Europe, so all experiments tending to settle peacefully present differences with Russia cannot produce positive results.

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